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I.  Introduction 
Empirical studies of mobility in the labor market have shown that quits 
are procyclical and layoffs are countercyclical.  In  addition,  most economists 
believe that at least some layoffs are involuntary.  That is,  laid-off  workers 
are worse off than they would be if they could have continued working at the 
wage paid to retained workers.  The purpose of this paper is to develop an 
implicit contracting model to help explain these phenomena. 
Equilibrium models of unemployment  have failed to explain why some 
unemployment might be involuntary.  For example, Lucas and Prescott  (1974) 
imply that workers will become unemployed if their expected present discounted 
value of future utility is greater than or equal to their discounted value of 
future utility when they are unemployed.  Another objection to using search 
models to explain unemployment is the assumption that unemployed search is 
more productive than employed search.  This assumption has frequently been 
questioned. 
Implicit contracts provided one of the first attempts to explain 
involuntary unemployment as an equilibrium phenomenon.  In Azariadis'  (1975) 
seminal work, involuntary unemployment  results because firms cannot make 
severance paymentsto laid-off workers.  In particular,  Azariadis assumes that 
1)  workers are risk averse while firms are risk neutral,  2)  working is a 0  or 
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firms cannot make severance payments to unemployed workers.  The optimal 
contract calls for workers to become unemployed during certain states of 
nature and,  because of the no-severance-payment assumption, to consume the 
value of their leisure.  Because workers are risk averse, they desire a 
constant consumption  stream,  and hence it is not optimal to lower the 
consumption of employed workers in bad states in order to induce them to 
leave. 
Another characteristic of Azariadis' model is that whenever there is 
involuntary unemployment there is also overemployment, that is,  overemployment 
occurs because there is more employment  (and  less unemployment) than would 
occur in a pure Walrasian market.  Workers remain employed even though their 
marginal productivity of labor is less than their reservation wage.  Both 
involuntary unemployment and overemployment result from the assumption that 
firms cannot make severance payments to laid-off workers.  As a result, 
the implication is that firms will partially insure workers against the risk 
of being laid off by having more employment than would occur in a pure 
Walrasian market.  Once severance payments are allowed, unemployment becomes 
purely voluntary and production is efficient. 
The goal of this paper is to integrate a simple model of on-  the-  job search 
with an implicit contracting model.  One objective is to be able to explain 
involuntary unemployment without placing any a priori restrictions on 
severance payments.  Like Azariadis' model,  the model predicts that there will 
be overemployment whenever there is involuntary unemployment.  This is in 
contrast to Grossman  and Hart (1983),  who developed a model to explain 
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attempts to explain both involuntary unemployment and underemployment,  but to 
do so he exogenously assumes that severance payments are zero. 
In  order to explain involuntary unemployment, it is promising to follow 
the lines of Kahn  (1985).  He showed that complete insurance is not possible 
(or  that wages will not be independent of the state of nature) when a firm 
cannot monitor a worker's alternative wage offer.  Arvan  (1986)  extended 
Kahn's analysis and suggested that this might explain why involuntary layoffs 
occur.  In Arvan's  model,  firms cannot insure against layoffs because of the 
need to promote on-the-job search.  However,  Arvan implicitly constrains the 
severance payment to laid-off workers to equal the severance payment offered 
to those who voluntarily quit their jobs.  It is this assumption that enables 
him to explain involuntary unemployment. 
This paper is similar to those by both Kahn and Arvan.  It also extends 
the implicit contracting framework by developing a model that can explain why 
quits are procyclical.  The structure of the paper is as follows.  Sections 
11-IV  consider a one-sector version of the model,  where only the primary 
sector is explicitly modeled.  Section I1 considers the case where a firm can 
observe both a worker's search intensity and whether the worker receives a job 
offer.  I  show that the optimal contract for this case implies complete 
insurance. 
Section I11  drops the assumption that a firm can observe a worker's 
search intensity,  but assumes that the firm can observe which workers receive 
job offers and can hence make severance payments conditional on the worker's 
accepting an offer.  This section shows that the firm's  inability to observe a 
worker's search efforts is not sufficient to produce involuntary unemployment. 
However, the optimal contract does result in incomplete risk-sharing because 
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to insure workers against future wage changes.  The optimal contract is also 
characterized by production efficiency for laid-off workers.  However,  workers 
who receive job offers are shown to leave more often than they would in a 
Walrasian world. 
Section IV shows that when firms cannot observe both a worker's search 
efforts and whether the worker receives a job offer,  the incentive-compatible 
contract implies that laid-off workers will be worse off than their employed 
counterparts.  Involuntary unemployment provides the proper incentive in bad 
states of nature for job-finders to reveal that they received an offer. 
Section V extends the previous analysis by explicitly modeling both sectors. 
I show that a two-sector implicit contracting model can help explain why quits 
are procyclical.  The model also predicts that while fewer workers receive job 
offers in such a model, there are states of nature that promote more mobility 
than in a Walrasian labor market.  For example,  in some states of nature,  both 
sectors will be hiring workers from the other sector.  This occurs because 
firms must provide incentives for on-the-job search. 
11.  The Model with Symmetric Information 
Consider an economy that lasts for two periods indexed by t = 1,  2.  Labor 
is hired in the first period, and production takes place according to a 
deterministic production function f(N).  Production in the second period is 
subject to a random shock,  6,  where the range of 6 is the closed interval 
[O,  Ow],  with a density function and a cumulative distribution function of 
g(0)  and G(0),  respectively.  During the first period,  workers can search 
for alternate work in another sector in case of a bad shock to the industry's 
output in the second period. 
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of finding a job is assumed to be an increasing function of effort expended on 
search, but the workers' utility is assumed to be a decreasing function of 
effort expended on  search.  These relationships are expressed by a function 
c(X),  which indicates the disutility associated with expending enough search 
to find a job with probability A. 
The cost of pursuing on-the-job search is assumed not to affect a worker's 
marginal utility of income.  In that sense,  searching can be thought of as 
requiring a "psychic" cost c(A).  Preferences are given by U(C  + BL)  -  c(X), 
where L is leisure, B is the value of leisure or the reservation wage of a 
worker,  and C is consumption.  The following restrictions are placed on 
utility:  L  E  [O,  11,  0  2 X 5 1,  U1'(.)  < 0,  and c"(X)  > 0. 
Restricting L to be either one  (not  working) or zero  (working)  assumes that 
hours worked is not a choice variable.  Searching also is assumed not to 
affect the productivity of a worker.  The assumption that search effort enters 
separably in the worker's utility function is not crucial;  it is meant to aid 
comparison with other implicit contracting models. 
An alternative explanation of the model is that workers must undergo 
training on the job if they wish to switch to another sector.  The cost of 
training would be c(X),  where X is the probability that the training is 
successful.  The same restrictions as before would be placed on c(X). 
A worker's productivity  (and  hence wage) at the alternate sector is 
exogenously given to be w'.  Searching does not affect this productivity/wage 
offer.  That is,  plants are either productive and produce w', or are not 
productive.  It is also assumed that the firm cannot hire workers in the 
second period.  This assumption will be dropped later so that additional labor 
can be hired in period two at the market wage rate,  w'. 
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transition from employment to unemployment.  These definitions are motivated 
by the empirical regularity that most people who report being laid off become 
unemployed  (at  least temporarily),  while workers who report quitting their 
previous job typically do not have an intewening  spell of unemployment. 
Contracts consist of wages, severance payments, layoff probabilities,  and 
a search intensity.  That is,  a contract consists of (wl,  w2(0),  1(0),  q(0), 
sl  (0) ,  sq(0),  A), where wl  is the first-period wage; w2(B) 
is the second-period wage chosen in period one contingent upon the realization 
of 0 in period two;  and l(0)  is the fraction of workers without outside 
offers who are laid off,  while q(0)  is the fraction of workers who receive 
outside offers who quit;  and sl(0)  and ~~(0)  are the severance 
payments  (or  taxes) given to  (or  applied to) workers who did not receive job 
offers and workers who did receive job offers,  respectively.  For the 
full-information  case considered below,  one can think of the firm as also 
choosing the search intensity of workers,  A. 
Defining V(.)  to be the discounted value of utility for a representative 
worker and assuming that workers cannot save or dissave so that their 
consumption in every period is equal to their wage in that period, the 
expected utility of a representative worker equals 
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receives a job offer from outside,  but remains employed at his original firm 
earning ~~(8);  Xq(8)  is the probability that a worker receives a job 
offer and accepts it,  in which case he earns w'  plus a severance payment 
sq(8);  (1-X)(l-l(8))  is the probability that a worker does not find a 
job and is not laid off,  in which case he earns ~~(8);  (1-X)1(8)  is 
the probability that the worker does not receive a job offer and is laid off, 
in which case he earns the value of his leisure, B,  and a severance payment, 
sl(8).  The firm is assumed to maximize profits where profits are 
given by 
The optimal employment contract maximizes expected utility subject to 
nonnegative prof  its. 
The first-order conditions can be characterized by the following equations: 
(1)  U' (w,)  = U'  (~~(8)) = U' (w1+sq(6'))  = U' (B+sl  (8))  = Y,, 
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(2)  Bf'([l-Xq(B)]N)  = w'  when O > BE, 
(3)  Bfl([(l-1(8))(1-X)]N)  = B  when B <  OL 
q(B)=l,  1(B)  = 0  when OL < O < OH 
where B,f'  ([I-X]N) = B, 6,f'  ([I-X]N) = w' , 
(4)  c'  (A)  = 7,  [G(OL) (w' -B) +  eL~eE(~'  -  Of' ((1-X)N)g(B)dB] , 
where -y  is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the expected profit 
constraint and -yl  = N-y. 
The solution to this problem is straightforward.  Since there are no 
informational asymmetries,  the optimal contract involves both perfect 
risk-sharing and production efficiency.  From (I), workers are guaranteed the 
same income  (or  income equivalent) during all states of the world, independent 
of both the state of nature and whether a worker receives a job offer. 
Workers who are successful in their job search subsidize those who are 
unsuccessful.  From  (2)  and  (3)  we have production efficiency.  Workers are 
laid off only after all workers who received outside offers have quit.  Since 
w' > B,  it is cheaper for the firm to let all the workers with outside offers 
quit and earn w' than to lay off a worker who has an income equivalent of B. 
When B >  OH, no workers are laid off and workers with outside offers quit 
until the marginal productivity of the remaining workers equals the wage 
earned by the workers who quit, w'.  After workers with outside offers leave, 
firms do not start laying off workers until the marginal productivity of labor 
equals the reservation  wage for a worker without an outside offer, B,  <  B 
< B,.  When B <  B,,  firms lay off workers until the marginal 
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Firms then subsidize workers who are laid off by giving them a severance 
payment so that they are indifferent between staying with the firm or leaving. 
Firms also force workers to supply the optimum amount of search intensity 
given by  (3).  One can think of wages being set equal to zero when workers 
supply less than the required amount of search effort.  The marginal cost of 
searching is equal to the marginal benefit of searching.  The marginal benefit 
of searching is the difference between what the worker would earn in an 
alternate job,  w', and what he produces in his current job, Of'(.).  In good 
states of nature  (B  >  B,),  this difference is zero from production 
efficiency,  while in bad states of nature  (B  < BL)  the difference is w'-B. 
When BL <  B  < 0, (that  is, q(B)  = 1,1(8)  = 0),  this difference is 
w'  -  Of'(.)  otherwise.  The marginal benefit of searching is therefore the 
difference between what the worker would earn if he quit and what he would 
produce if he stayed.  Since the marginal cost of searching has units of 
utilities, this quantity is multiplied by a worker's marginal utility of 
income. 
This contract specifies that all workers receive the same utility whether 
or not they succeed in finding outside alternatives.  Hence,  if firms did not 
know how hard a worker had searched, this contract would offer no incentive 
for workers to search.  The next section considers the optimal contract when a 
firm cannot monitor a worker's  search intensity. 
111.  Imperfect Monitoring 
In this section, it is assumed that a worker's search intensity is known 
only by the worker.  However,  it is assumed that the following contingency can 
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conditional on the worker's accepting a job offer.  With asymmetric 
information, firms choose the optimal contract on the assumption that workers 
will then choose A to maximize their utility given this contract.  That is, 
given a contract (wl,  w2(e>, sq(B>, sl(B),  q(d),  1(0)1, 
workers will choose their desired search intensity, A*,  such that 
To solve for the optimal contract,  we replace the above condition with the 
first-order condition for an agent's  search effort.  It shows how agents 
choose X in response to the employment contract.  This incentive- 
compatibility constraint is appended to the optimal contract problem in the 
previous section giving 
S( (1-q(e))u(w2(e))  + q(e)u(wf+sq(e>)  )g(e)de 
-  J'(  (1-1  (6'))U(w2(e)  +  l(O)U(B+~~(O)))g(e)de  -  C'  (A)  = 0. 
The first-order conditions can be characterized by the following 
equations: 
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(2)  u'  (w2(B))  =  [(A*,)  (1-q(B))+(l-A-7,)  (1-1 (B))] 
1  if  W(B)  -  efl((l-~)[l-1(8)]~) > 0 
(5)  q(8)  =  q*~)  where  W(6)  -  Bfl([A(l-q*(B)+(l-A)(l-1)]N)  = 0 
0  if  W(B)  -  Bfl([l-(1-A)I]N) < 0 
where 
W(0)  = w'  +  (U(wl+sq)  -  U(w2)  -  U' (wl+sq)  [(w'+sq)  -  w,]  I/U1  (wl+sq) 
1  if  B -  Bf'(A(1-q(B))  > 0 
(6)  l(8)  = 1*(B)  where  B -  Bfl([A(l-q(B)+(l-A)[l-l*(B)]N)  = 0 
0  if  B -  Bfl((l-Xq(B))N)  < 0 
From equations (5), (6),  and  (7)  we obtain: 
q(8)  = 1,  l(8)  >O  when B < BL 
q(8)  = 1,  l(8)  = 0 when BL<  B <  OH 
q(8)  < 1,  l(8)  = 0 when B > BE 
7,(l-A) 
(2a)  U1(w2(e>>  =  when 0 <  BL  (1-A-7,) 
7,(l-xq(e)> 
(2b)  u'  (w~O))  =  [1-(1\+72)q(fi)]  when B > BL 
where BLfl  ([I-A]N) = B, OHfl  ([I-A]N) = W(B). 
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occur only after all workers with outside offers accept employment.  From  (2a) 
and (4),  when  6'  < BL, layoffs occur and there is complete insurance for 
laid-off workers, that is,  B +  sl = w2.  When 6'  > OH, not all 
workers with outside offers accept new jobs.  From  (2b)  and (3), workers who 
receive job offers and leave the firm are subsidized and earn more than those 
who do not find other employment, that is,  w'  +  sq  > w2.  However, this 
differential gets smaller with better states of nature. 
Since workers are risk averse, the definition of W(6')  in equation  (5)  and 
(2b)  implies that when OL < 6'  < OH, the marginal productivity of labor 
will decrease with better states of nature.  Similarly,  using the fact that 
U(C)  is concave,  the definition of W(6')  and  (5)  shows that workers with 
outside offers are allowed to leave the firm more often than they did with 
symmetric information,  that is,  W(6')  > w'.  The intuition behind this result 
is that on-the-margin firms find it optimal to provide additional incentives 
for on-the-job search by allowing workers to earn more after they find another 
job,  and also by allowing them to leave more often than they would if they had 
full information.  From (5),  the amount that production differs from a 
Walrasian market depends on the curvature of the utility function.  The more 
risk-averse the worker, the greater the need to insure his income.  Since 
insurance results in less search effort,  firms provide incentives for 
on-the-job search by allowing workers to leave more often than in a world with 
symmetric information. 
It should be noted that the above solution assumes that firms have the 
power to either subsidize or tax workers who leave.  When 6'  >  OH, the firm 
announces that the first q(6')N workers who volunteer to leave can do so with 
a severance payment of ~~(6').  The rest of the job-finders voluntarily stay 
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successful workers to prevent them from leaving. 
Since workers respond optimally to changes in the contract offered to 
them, equation  (7)  states that their search intensity will be chosen so that 
the change in the marginal cost to workers from increasing their search effort 
is equal to the marginal benefit  (expressed  in units of utility) to the firm 
resulting from workers' increasing their search effort.  The marginal benefit 
from increasing a worker's search intensity is the difference between what the 
worker is paid, w2,  and the sum of what he produces,  Of
1(.),  and the 
severance payment given to departing workers, sq(0).  The proof that y2 
is strictly positive follows because when -y2  < 0,  workers would have no 
incentive to search.  A sufficient condition for an interior solution to occur 
is that c'(0)  = 0,  cl(l) = a and w'  > B,  that is,  it is costless to exert a 
little search effort,  but the marginal cost of searching so that a worker can 
ensure a job offer is infinitely costly. 
Note that when Ofl(X(l-q*(O)N)  > w', there is an incentive for workers 
who receive job offers to recontract with the firm.  This is not possible, 
however,  given the assumption that firms can observe which workers received 
job offers after the offers were accepted.  In addition,  there is an implicit 
assumption that firms cannot hire these workers back after the offer has been 
accepted.  If the firm could costlessly observe a worker's offer, there would 
always be production efficiency because firms could bribe workers who found 
jobs to continue employment by offering them a higher wage rate,  w'. 
If the marginal productivity of labor is greater than w', then the firm has an 
incentive to induce workers who received an offer to stay,  since they can 
produce more at their present job than they can at an alternative job. 
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assumption,  cannot hire workers in the second period at the market wage rate, 
w'.  If additional labor can be hired,  then an interesting result occurs. 
Workers will leave the firm while other workers are being hired by the firm. 
Since the marginal productivity of labor is greater than w', the firm has an 
incentive to hire additional workers at a wage of wf  .  Although ex post this 
seems wasteful  (because  of possible moving costs that are not built into the 
model),  ex ante such behavior is necessary in order to motivate workers to 
engage in on-  the  -  j  ob search. 
To formalize,  assume that the firm can hire n(9)  workers in the second 
period at a  market wage rate of wf.  The optimal contract is then to 
choose (wl(9),  w2(S),  sq(S),  sl(9),  q(9),  1(9),  A, n(9))  in order to maximize 
expected utility subject to the constraint of nonnegative profits,  the 
incentive-compatibility  constraint,  and the restriction that additional 
employment in period two be nonnegative: 
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equations: 
1  if  W(B)  -  Bf'  ((1-A)  [1-l(9)  ]N+n(B))  > 0 
(5)  q(B)  = q*(B)  where  W(B)  -  Bfl([X(l-q*(B)+(l-A)(l-l)]N+n(B))  = 0 
0  if  W(0)  -  Bfl([l-(1-X)l]N+n(e))  < 0 
where 
W(B)  = w'  +  (U(wl+sq) -  U(w2)  -  U' (wl+sq)  [(wl+sq)  -  w2]  )/U1  (wl+sq) 
1  if  B -  Bfl(X(l-q(B)+n(B))  > 0 
(6)  l(9)  =  l*(B)  where  B -  Bfl([X(l-q(B)+(l-X)(l-l*(B))]N+n(B))  = 0 
0  if  B -  Bfl((l-Aq(B))N+n(B))  < 0 
w  if  w' -  eft(-) > 0 
(7)  n(B)  = n*(B)  where  w' -  Bfl(X(l-q(B)+(l-X)(l-l(B))]N+n*(B))  = 0 
0  if  w'  -  Ofl(x(l-q(e)+(l-~)(l-I(B))]N)  < 0 
Using e.l),  e.2),  e.3),  and b) yields: 
q(B)  = 1,  l(8)  < 0,  n(B)  = 0  when 0  <  BL 
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q(B)  = 1,  l(19)  = 0,  n(B)  > 0  when 6'  >  BH 
where BLff  ([1-X]N) = B,  BHfl  ([1-X]N) = w' . 
The results when the firm can hire additional workers at a wage of w' are 
as follows.  Workers who stay with the firm earn a wage w2,  which is 
independent of the state of the world.  Workers who receive job offers accept 
their offers and receive a severance payment from the firm, sg,  which is 
also state-independent.  When firms lay off workers,  that is,  when B <  BL, 
there are complete severance payments and production efficiency.  All workers 
with outside offers will quit and no additional workers will be hired in these 
states of nature.  When BL <  B <  OH, all workers with outside offers 
quit,  no workers are laid off,  and no additional workers are hired.  When 
0 >  OH, all workers with outside offers quit and no workers are laid off, 
but the firm hires additional workers at a wage of w' until production 
efficiency prevails. 
The contract implies a two-tier system for adjusting a firm's work force. 
Firms first offer a severance payment to workers who wish to leave the firm. 
Every worker who has found another job will then accept this offer.  In more 
complex models,  one can think of the severance payment offered to departing 
workers as also consisting of possible early retirementbenefits,  etc.  After 
workers accept this offer, the firm then adjusts the labor force by laying off 
workers or hiring workers until it reaches the desired level of employment. 
This sort of two-tier system seems to have its counterpart in the world. 
Although the current analysis indicates that those who find jobs will always 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyleave the firm, the reason is that no adjustment costs are incurred when 
hiring new workers.  If there were adjustment costs  (or  firm-specific human 
capital), not all of the workers who found jobs would leave the firm. 
It should be noted that since every worker who receives an outside job 
offer is allowed to accept the offer, the assumption that firms have the power 
to tax workers who 1,eave  is no longer necessary.  Equation  (3)  assumes that 
the severance payment to workers who receive job offers might be negative. 
Since y2, cl'(X), and 7l  are all positive and Of
1(.)  2 B,  the 
optimal contract implies that sl(0)  > sq(0).  The intuition 
behind this result is straightforward.  Consider the optimal contract when 
workers are risk neutral.  In this case, production efficiency results and 
workers are paid the value of their marginal productivity in every state of 
the world.  Workers would earn Of'(.)  in all states of nature  (B  when 6'  < 
B,,  and w' when B >  OH).  The first-period wage would be chosen so that 
firms earn zero expected profits.  With risk-averse workers,  firms trade off 
the incentives of providing on-the-job search with insurance against wage 
changes.  First-period  wages would be reduced in order to smooth second-period 
earnings; that is,  sl(0)  > sq(0).  Otherwise,  it would be 
preferable to keep the contract that resulted when workers were risk neutral, 
since it also provided the proper incentives for on-the-job search. 
When the assumption that firms can observe which workers receive job 
offers is dropped, the above contract must be modified to make it 
incentive-compatible.  The reason is that the severance payment offered to 
workers who find alternate employment is less than the one offered to workers 
who are laid off.  The following incentive-compatibility  constraint reflects 
the constraint necessary to prevent workers with outside offers from accepting 
these offers during bad states of nature: 
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received a job offer.  To induce workers to tell the truth, the expected 
utility of a worker who admits to receiving a job offer must be greater than 
the expected utility of a worker who does not admit to receiving a job offer. 
In particular,  when l(0)  = 0,  the above constraint is always satisfied. 
However,  when l(0)  is near one  (that  is,  when a large fraction of the 
labor force is being laid off),  the above constraint is not satisfied.  To 
make the above contract incentive-compatible,  severance payments to quits and 
layoffs must be equal when l(8)  = 0.  This restriction implies that there 
will be involuntary unemployment during bad states of nature.  The next 
section solves for the optimal contract when the firm cannot observe both a 
worker's search intensity or whether a worker receives a job offer. 
IV.  Involuntary Layoffs 
Although the assumption that firms can hire additional labor in the second 
period is not necessary for the following results, it will be maintained in 
this section.  Since firms cannot monitor which workers receive job offers, 
the optimal contract in the previous section may not be incentive-compatible. 
For the following contract it will be assumed that either w2  < w', or that 
the firm can restrict the mobility of job-finders by taxing them when they 
leave.  The optimal contract with an additional incentive-compatibility 
constraint is to choose (wl(B), wz(t9),  sq(e),  sl(B),  q(B),  1(6'),  A,  n(0)) 
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the incentive-compatibility constraints, and the restriction that employment 
be nonnegative: 
The first-order conditions can be characterized by the following 
equations: 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copy1  if  w(e)  -  eft  ((1-A)  [1-1  (e) ]N+n(B))  > 0 
(5)  q(8)  = q*(B)  where  W(0)  -  Bfl([A(l-q*(B)+(l-A)(l-l)]N+n(B))  = 0 
0  if  W(0)  -  Bfl([l-(1-A)l]N+n(O))  < 0 
where 
W(8)  = w' +  (U(w'+s,)  -  U(w2)  -  U' (wl+sq)  [(wl+s,)  -  w2]  )/U1  (wl+sq) 
1  if  K(8)  -  8f1(X(1-q(B)+n(B))  < 0 
(6)  l(8)  = 1*(8)  where  K(d)  -  Of'  ([A(l-q(B)+(l-A)  (l-l*(B))  IN+n(B))  = 0 
0  if  K(0)  -  Bfl((l-Xq(B))N+n(B))  < 0 
where 
K(8)  = B +  (1/U1(w2)  [U(B+sl(fi))  -  U(w2(e))I 
-  [B+sl  -w,]+ U' (w2)  [U(B+sl)  -  U(w'+sl  (4))  I I 
a  if  w' -  Bfl(w) > 0 
(7)  n(8)  = n*(B)  where  w' -  Bf'  (A(1-q(B)+(l-A)  (1-1  (B))]N+n*(B))  = 0 
o  if  w1  -  efl(~(l-~(~>+(I-A)(~-~(B))IN)  < o 
From equations (5),  (6), (7),  and (8)  we obtain: 
q(8)  = 1,  l(8)  > 0,  n(8)  = 0 when 6'  <  BL 
q(0)  = 1,  l(8)  = 0,  n(B)  = 0 when BL < 8 <  OH 
q(8)  = 1,  1(B)  = 0,  n(8)  > 0 when 0 > BH 
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The solution to this problem is identical to that given in the previous 
section except for the inclusion of the costate variable, -y3(8),  which 
becomes binding in  "bad enough" states of nature.  It can be shown that when 
-y3(B)  > 0,  the severance payment offered to departing workers increases, 
while the wage offered to job stayers and the severance payment to laid-off 
workers decreases.  In addition, there will be fewer layoffs than in a 
Walrasian market or overemployment.  This occurs when a large fraction of a 
given cohort of workers is being laid off.  When productivity is high enough 
or,  equivalently,  when there are few layoffs, the incentive-compatibility 
constraint holds and -y3(8) = 0.  However,  when productivity is low, 
-y3(B)  must be greater than zero for the incentive-compatibility  constraint 
to hold.  Since q(B)  = 1,  when B <  BL the incentive-compatibility 
constraint becomes 
In  order for workers to engage in on-the-job search in the first period, 
we know that w1+sP(B) > w2(B) .  Hence the above constraint fails when 
1(B)  is near one.  Four margins of adjustment occur in order for the 
incentive-compatibility  constraint to hold:  First, from (6),  since U(C)  is 
concave l(0)  must decrease, that is, there is overemployment.  Second, 
from  (b)  and  (d),  both w2(B)  and sl(B)  must decrease.  Finally, 
from (3), sq(B)  must increase.  These adjustments occur when -y3(8)  is 
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would be violated. 
Involuntary unemployment occurs when a large fraction of the firm's  labor 
force is laid off.  This condition seems particularly strong;  however,  it does 
not seem unreasonable if the condition is interpreted to be a plant closing. 
The model predicts that severance payments to both quits and layoffs will 
be state-independent  except during downturns.  During severe downturns,  the 
severance payment or bonus offered in the first phase of the labor-force 
adjustment will actually increase, so that workers who find jobs will 
truthfully reveal their job offers.  In addition, during these downturns the 
severance payments to laid-off  workers will decrease so that they are 
involuntarily laid off. 
V.  A Two-Sector  Implicit Contracting Model 
This section extends the analysis of the previous sections by explicitly 
modeling the second sector.  Instead of assuming that job-finders receive a 
wage exogenously given to be w', workers who switch sectors enter a spot 
market and are paid their marginal productivity.  It is shown that a 
two-sector implicit contracting model helps explain why quits are procyclical. 
Each sector of the economy has many identical firms.  Both sectors are 
identical in period one,  but differ according to the technological shock 
affecting their sector in the second period.  The first-period production 
function for sector A and sector B is given by F(NIA)  and F(NIB), 
respectively.  In the second period there is a shock to production,  BA and 
BB, where 9'  denotes the vector  (BA,  dB).  The second-period 
production function for sector A firms is given by BAf(NA),  while the 
production function for sector B firms is given by BBf(N,,).  It is 
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function, g(BA)  and g(BB).  At the beginning of period two, everyone can 
costlessly observe the state of nature 8'. 
The economy is inhabited by 2N agents.  Due to industry- or 
sector-specific human capital,  which agents acquire by working in a sector 
during the first period, an agent cannot work in the other sector during the 
second period without additional training.  For a worker in sector A [B]  in 
the first period to be productive in sector B  [A] in the second period,  he 
must expend a cost c(AA)  [c(AB)].  However,  training is not perfect;  a 
worker who undergoes training may or may not learn the skills necessary to 
switch sectors.  A first-period  employee of sector A [B] is successful in his 
attempt to be productive in the other sector with probability XA [AB]. 
Workers must undertake this investment in period one before the realization of 
8,  and OB. 
A worker's skills are not left entirely to chance.  A worker can increase 
the probability that he will be productive in the other sector by spending 
more on training in the first period.  That is, the more a worker invests in 
learning the skills of the other firm  (the  higher is c(Xi)  i=A,B), the 
greater the probability that he will become productive in the other sector 
(the  larger is Xi).  The same restrictions as earlier are placed on 
c(X,>. 
A worker who learns the skills necessary to work in the other sector may 
or may not receive a job offer to work in that sector.  A worker in sector A 
[B] who is also productive in sector B  [A] receives a job offer from that 
sector with probability hB(B1) (hA(B1)),  where hA(B1) and hB(B1) 
are chosen by firms A and B,  respectively.  Therefore, XAhB(B1)  is the 
probability that a worker in sector A will receive an offer to work in sector 
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Best available copyB.  However,  as in the previous sections,  only a fraction,  q  (B'),  (chosen 
A 
by firm A)  of these workers will be hired by sector B. 
A worker currently working in sector A who is hired by sector B receives a 
wage,  ~'~(0'). Since this wage is determined in a spot market, 
second-period  wages must equal the worker's  marginal productivity,  wtB(B') 
=  0Bf'(N2B).  competition for workers who change jobs ensures that 
this equality holds.  In addition to a wage of ~'~(0')~  firm A chooses a 
severance payment of sPA(B1) to pay its departing workers. 
Unlike the previous section,  which tried to rationalize the existence of 
involuntary layoffs, this section is not concerned with whether a layoff is 
voluntary or involuntary.  Thus,  we will keep the assumption of section I11 by 
assuming that a firm can observe whether a previous employee starts work at 
another firm and thus can condition its severance payment on this realization. 
We also assume that firms can observe which sector an ex-employee works for 
and can condition its severance payment on this realization.  Since all firms 
in a given sector are identical,  firms do not give severance payments to 
workers wishing to work in the same sector.  In  fact,  the contract may call 
for the firm to tax workers to prevent them from working at a 
different firm within the same sector.  Because there is no benefit to working 
at a different firm within the same sector,  the optimal contract does not 
allow for that possibility.  These assumptions allow us to model the problem 
as if each sector were comprised of one representative firm. 
The analysis assumes that firms do not have implicit contracts with the 
workers in the alternate sector.  Otherwise,  in period one,  a firm in sector A 
would promise a second-period wage  (conditional  on 0')  to workers in sector B 
who wish to switch sectors.  Firms would do this in order to induce workers in 
the other sector to acquire the skills necessary for work in their sector. 
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firm would have an incentive to make such a promise:  it would not change the 
incentive for workers in the other sector to engage in on-the-job training. 
Given these restrictions,  second-period employment for a firm in sector A 
and a firm in sector B is given by the following equations: 
As in the previous sections,  a worker signs a contract with his firm 
specifying the second-period wage,  the severance payments,  and separation 
probabilities contingent on the state of nature in the second period, O', as 
well as on the first-period wage.  Contracts are chosen in the first period to 
maximize the utility of the representative worker subject to a given level of 
profits and the incentive-compatibility  constraint. 
Firms are assumed to be Nash competitors; they assume that their choice of 
a contract has no effect on the contract offered by the other firms  (the  other 
sector).  The optimal contract for firm A is then to choose 
cwU,  ~~~(0')  , ~'~(0')  ,  lA(el> qA(el)  ,  slA(e')  9 
sBA(O1),  hA(B'),  XA)  to maximize 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
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(1) U'blA)  = 7, 
1  if  w(el) -  efl(N,)  > 0 
(5a)  q(0')  =  q*(el 1  if  w(el) -  eft  (N,)  = o 
0  if  W(el) -  efl(N,)  <  0 
where 
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Best available copyW(B1) = w',  +  (U(wl,+sq)  -  U(wZA) 
-  U'  (wtB+sqA)  [ (wrB+sqA)  -  wZA]  )/Ur  (wrB+sqA) 
Since sector B is identical,  the following consistency conditions must 
also hold  (all  variables are taken to solve the preceding first-order 
conditions): 
1,(OA,  0,)  = 1,(B,,BA)  q,(B,,B,)  = qB(BB,BA) 
hA(BA,BB)  = hB(BB,BA) wZA(BA,BB)  = wZB(BB,BA) 
slA(BA,BB)  = slB(BB,BA),  sqA(BA,BB)  = sqB(BB,BA) 
WIA  = wlB,  A,  = A,,  hB(efl(~,,)  -  wl(el)) = 0. 
The following equations summarize the dynamics of the system.  Because of 
the above consistency conditions,  we denote i,  j =  (A,  B)  where i = j. 
0 < li(B1)  < 1,  qi(Br)  = 1,  hi(Br)  = 0  when 8, 2 BL(Bj) 
li(er)  = 0,  qi(et)  = 1,  0  < hi(Br) < 1  when BL(Bj)  < Bi 5  B,(Bj) 
li(Br)  = 0,  q (0') = 1,  hi(B1) = 1 
i  when BM(Bj)  < Bi 5  BH(Bj) 
li(Br)  = 0,  0 < qi(B')  < 1,  h,(B1)  = 1  when Bi >  BH(Bj) 
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BL(Bj)  solves BL(ej)fr ([1-Xhj(Oj  ,OL) INlj)  = B 
where 
0  if  Bjfr(N,)  -  B<O 
h(O  j,  eL)  =  indeterminate  if  Bj = 0, 
1  if Bjfr([l+X]Nl)  -  B > 0. 
dM(Bj)  solves 8,(dj)fr  ([~+A[~(B~  ,B~)-~(~~,o,])N')  = B 
where 
q(ej,oM) = 1,  h(ej,eM) = 0  if ejfr  ([l-X)(l-l(dj,OL))  IN1) = B 
for some 0  < l(O,,BM)  < 1 
q(dj,O,)  = 1,  h(ej,oM) = 1  if e  jft  (N,)  5  w(BA,  0,) 
h(Oj,0,)  = 1,  0  < q(Bj,BM) < 1  if Bjfr([l+X(l-q(Bj,B))]N1) = W(BA,O,) 
for some 0  < q(Bj,BM) < 1 
q(Bj,BM) = 0,  h(Bj  ,OM) = 1  if Ojfr([l+X]Nl) > W(BA,BB) 
where 
W(dA,  0,)  = w',  +  (U(wrB+sqA)  -  u(wZA) 
-  ur  (wrB+sqA)  [ (w'B+sqA) -  wZAl  )/Ur  (w'B+sqA) 
and 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyBH(Bj)  solves BH(Bj)ft  ([l+X(l-h(ej,  eH))IN1)  = W(eA,eB) 
where h(Bj,BH)  = h(ej,BH). 
The above conditions imply that the following hold: 
(2a)  U'(W,~(B'))  =  71i1hXi for 8, < 8,(Ot) 
(Xi+7,,) 
71i(l-hjAiqi(e  '1) 
(2b)  U'(w2,(B1))  =  for ei > e,(et).  a-hj  (Ai+72i) 1 
The model predicts that quits can occur in equilibrium even when the 
productivity shocks in the two industries are identical.  This contrasts with 
a Walrasian  model where the number of quits depends on the dispersion of the 
productivity shocks across sectors.  The model also predicts that quits will 
generally be procyclical.  For example, if Oi =  Bj and if demand is low 
in both sectors,  no quits occur,  because neither industry is willing to hire 
workers from the other industry.  As productivity in both industries gets 
progressively better,  quits increase discontinuously from 0  to 2X.  That is, 
quits increase until everyone who is productive in the other sector switches 
sectors.  This discontinuity results from the assumption that the shocks to 
the two sectors are identical, Bi - Bj.  As soon as industry A and 
industry B find it profitable to hire a worker from the other industry, each 
will then find it profitable to hire one more worker to replace the worker who 
shifted sectors.  This process continues until h = 1. 
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Best available copyWhen the shock increases in only one sector, this discontinuity does not 
occur.  When the sector with the good technological shock finds it profitable 
to hire a worker from the other sector,  the low-shock  sector will respond by 
laying off one fewer worker.  Thus, the model also predicts that there should 
be more layoffs within each industry  (or  that layoffs will occur sooner) if 
both B,  and Bj are low rather than if there is a downturn that is 
confined to only one sector. 
While the model in general predicts that quits should be procyclical, 
quits may start decreasing when productivity increases in only one of the 
sectors.  This occurs when demand is unusually high in only one of the 
sectors, so that the sector will find it profitable to retain workers instead 
of letting them quit,  q < 1.  The model has a bias toward quits because of the 
need to promote on-the-job training.  However,  when the technology shock to a 
particular industry is very high, this bias is not as important as the need to 
retain workers.  When productivity increases in both sectors,  this turning 
point does not occur,  because the incentive to let workers quit is greater, 
the more the other sector pays to newly hired workers. 
Wages respond as follows:  second-period  wages for those who stay with 
their original firm depend on the state of nature in both sectors.  From  (2a) 
and (2b), wages either decrease or remain constant when the other sector 
becomes more productive,  and wages increase  (or  remain constant) with 
increases in the productivity affecting their own sector. 
These wage changes result from the need to promote on-the-job training. 
The more people who switch sectors, the greater the effect  (ex  ante) of a high 
wage differential between those who switch sectors and those who stay.  Thus, 
the higher the shock affecting sector B,  the lower the wage that will be paid 
in sector A to job stayers.  Similarly,  when the technological shock to 
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Best available copyindustry A is very high,  fewer workers will switch sectors and, thus, higher 
wages will be paid to job stayers. 
Severance payments to quits increase with the wage paid by the other 
sector,  so that the wage plus severance payment is constant over all states of 
nature.  This implies that if one wanted to generate involuntary layoffs in 
this two-sector model,  the productivity shock would have to be very low in one 
of the sectors and quite low in the other sector.  This corresponds to job 
finders receiving a very low severance payment and a large chance that they 
would be laid off with a larger severance payment if they did not admit to 
receiving a job offer. 
This analysis suggests that one way to generate involuntary layoffs is for 
job finders to want to pretend that they did not receive a job offer in order 
to collect the severance payment to laid-off workers.  That is,  involuntary 
unemployment can be explained by understanding why severance payment to quits 
is low.  This might occur if the informational restrictions of this section 
were loosened.  For example,  it has been assumed that an employer could 
observe whether or not a worker quit to accept a job in the same sector.  If 
employers could not observe whether this occurred, then severance payments 
would have to be restrained to prevent workers from switching jobs within the 
same sector. 
VI.  Conclusions 
This paper builds a two-sector implicit contracting model in order to 
investigate the conditions under which involuntary unemployment can result and 
to help understand why quits are procyclical.  The results are encouraging: 
under certain conditions quits can be procyclical and layoffs can be 
countercyclical,  and some layoffs may be involuntary.  To achieve this result, 
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intensity and that firms cannot monitor which workers receive job offers. 
Involuntary unemployment results in order to induce workers to reveal 
successful search efforts. 
The paper also shows that firms will have a two-tier procedure for 
adjusting their labor force to current economic conditions.  In the first 
round,  workers with outside offers leave the firm; in the second round, the 
firm adjusts its labor force by either laying off additional workers or hiring 
new workers.  The model implies that workers will leave firms in sector A for 
firms in sector B,  and at the same time,  firms in sector A will hire 
additional workers from sector B.  This occurs because firms have to offer 
contracts in order to give workers incentives to engage in on-the-job 
search/training.  This implies that firms subsidize workers when they leave, 
and they let workers leave more often than would happen in a Walrasian market. 
One frequent criticism of the above analysis is the implication that firms 
are subsidizing workers to engage in more on-  the-  j  ob search/training.  Ex ante 
contracts will be chosen so that workers will find it optimal to engage in 
such search activity;  however,  ex post,  it would not be surprising to think 
that firms are in some sense antagonistic to such activity.  Firms will, of 
course, wish that none of their workers are successful in their job search. 
Similarly, another way of thinking about the problem is that firms sign 
contracts that reduce worker mobility in order to partially insure workers 
against income changes. 
This paper shows why complete insurance to laid-off workers would not be 
optimal,  given the incentive-compatibility  constraints.  Additional empirical 
work is necessary to answer the question of whether the amount of severance 
payments predicted by models such as this occurs in the world.  State-mandated 
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Best available copyunemployment benefits are one reason that the amount of severance payments 
offered by firms might not be that extensive.  Theory suggests that the two 
are substitutes;  thus, increases in state-provided  unemployment insurance 
should decrease private severance-payment  programs.  Future empirical work can 
be conducted to see if privately financed unemployment benefits decrease with 
increases in state-provided  unemployment insurance. 
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